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UNSUPPORTABLE AND UNJUSTIFIED:  
A CRITIQUE OF ABSOLUTE PROSECUTORIAL 
IMMUNITY 
Margaret Z. Johns*
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since John G. Roberts, Jr., became Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme 
Court on September 29, 2005,1 the Court has shown a keen interest in civil 
rights actions against prosecutors and their immunity from liability.  
Specifically, the Court has granted certiorari in one case involving 
municipal liability for prosecutorial misconduct,2 and three cases 
addressing issues of prosecutorial liability and immunity.3  But despite this 
attention to these issues, it would be premature to ascribe an agenda to the 
Roberts Court based on the two decisions it has handed down to date.4
 
*  Senior Lecturer, University of California, Davis, School of Law; University of California, 
Davis, School of Law, J.D., 1976; University of California, Santa Barbara, B.A., 1970.  I am 
grateful for the opportunity to participate in the Fordham Law Review’s symposium on 
official and municipal liability for constitutional and tort liability, which was inspired and 
initiated by Professor Thomas H. Lee and flawlessly organized by Mari Byrne.  I am 
indebted to John R. Cuti with whom I co-authored an amicus brief in Van de Kamp v. 
Goldstein from which much of the historical analysis in Part III is derived.  Elizabeth 
McKechnie, my library liaison, provided invaluable research support.  My friend and 
colleague, Carter C. White, contributed numerous valuable suggestions.  And, as always, I 
relied on my family for support and encouragement—especially Bob and Daisy. 
  So 
rather than analyzing such a possible agenda, this Article will discuss three 
points where the analysis of prosecutorial immunity should be focused:  (1) 
the significant problem of prosecutorial misconduct and the lack of 
 1. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, U.S. SUPREME COURT, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 2. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (municipal liability for failure to 
train based on violations of the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). 
 3. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, (2011) (considering the U.S. Attorney 
General’s immunity for using a material witness warrant to detain a suspected terrorist); 
Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, 129 S. Ct. 2002, 2002 (2009) (case dismissed after 
settlement following oral argument); Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009); see 
also Boundaries of Prosecutorial Immunity to Be Tested in Upcoming Supreme Court Case, 
N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT NEWSL. (Santa Clara Law, Santa Clara, Cal.), Summer 2010, at 
1 [hereinafter Boundaries of Prosecutorial Immunity], available at http://law.scu.edu/
ncip/file/NCIP_Newsletter_Summer2010_web.pdf (reporting that McGhee was settled for 
$12 million for two wrongfully convicted men). 
 4. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1365–66 (2011) (holding that a municipality was not 
liable for a single Brady violation); Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 858–59 (2009) (holding that 
a prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity for failing to adopt an information 
management system regarding informants). 
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effective deterrent and corrective mechanisms; (2) the absence of any 
historical justification for the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity; 
and (3) the confusion and conflicts created by the current prosecutorial 
immunity doctrine. 
First, while the vast majority of prosecutors are dedicated, honest public 
servants who serve us all by prosecuting criminals and protecting us from 
crime, instances of prosecutorial misconduct are both substantial and  
significant.5  Recent reports have evaluated the frequency of prosecutorial 
misconduct, the extent to which prosecutorial misconduct leads to wrongful 
convictions, and the ineffectiveness of mechanisms designed to deter, 
remedy, or punish prosecutorial misconduct.6  The conclusions are clear:  
prosecutorial misconduct is a significant problem; it leads to a substantial 
number of wrongful convictions; and our system lacks effective 
mechanisms to deter or remedy prosecutorial misconduct.7
Second, in Supreme Court decisions analyzing the civil rights liability of 
prosecutors, a primary reason for extending absolute immunity to 
prosecutors today is historical.
 
8  In 1976, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the major federal statute for the protection of civil rights—42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, which was adopted by Congress in 1871 during the violence and 
chaos of Reconstruction—was intended to preserve the absolute immunities 
enjoyed by public officials under the existing common law.9  But in 1871, 
prosecutors did not enjoy absolute immunity.10  In fact, the first case 
affording prosecutors absolute immunity was not decided until twenty-five 
years after the adoption of § 1983.11  Indeed, in 1871, the Reconstruction 
Congress adopted § 1983 in part to address the abusive practice in the South 
of prosecuting Union officers and officials who were attempting to establish 
and enforce civil rights for newly freed slaves.12  In other words, the 1871 
Congress did not intend to immunize prosecutors from liability.  To the 
contrary, Congress intended to subject prosecutors to civil liability for using 
criminal prosecutions to thwart Reconstruction and deprive newly freed 
slaves of their newly gained civil rights.13
Third, the current doctrine of prosecutorial immunity is not only 
questionable as a matter of public policy and unjustified as a matter of 
history, it also creates confusion and conflicts which cause uncertainty and 
unnecessarily protracted litigation.
  Thus, the notion that absolute 
immunity is historically justified is just plain wrong. 
14
 
 5. See infra Part I. 
  Rather than streamlining the process 
 6. See infra Part I. 
 7. See infra Part I. 
 8. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 489–90 (1991); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 
421–24 (1976). 
 9. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 417–18. 
 10. Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. 
REV. 53, 107–22; see infra Part II. 
 11. See generally Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896). 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
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to facilitate the early resolution of claims as was intended, the doctrine 
complicates and prolongs the process.15  Specifically, the current doctrine 
affords prosecutors qualified immunity in some instances and absolute 
immunity in others.16  But the difficulty of drawing lines between cases 
where qualified immunity applies and those where absolute immunity 
applies generates needless litigation.17  Within eighteen months, the 
Roberts Court granted certiorari in two prosecutorial immunity cases.18  
Both cases illustrate the conflicts and complexities of the current 
prosecutorial immunity doctrine.19
This Article considers each of these points.  First, in Part I, it evaluates 
the mounting evidence that prosecutorial misconduct is the cause of a 
substantial number of wrongful convictions, and existing legal mechanisms 
are insufficient to deter or remedy that misconduct.  Part II considers the 
lack of historical justification for the Supreme Court’s recognition of the 
absolute prosecutorial immunity doctrine.  Finally, Part III addresses the 
unnecessary conflicts and confusion generated by the current doctrine of 
prosecutorial immunity and the benefits of its replacement with the uniform 
application of qualified immunity. 
  A simplified approach—applying 
qualified immunity in all cases—would serve public policy, respect 
historical understandings, and simplify and streamline civil rights litigation. 
I.  PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IS A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM LACKING 
EFFECTIVE DETERRENT OR REMEDIAL SAFEGUARDS 
In public debates about prosecutorial immunity, the frequency and 
significance of prosecutorial misconduct are disputed  and sometimes 
trivialized.20  But as recent studies establish, prosecutorial misconduct is a 
problem that contributes to a substantial number of wrongful convictions.21  
Moreover, despite layers of corrective procedures, our current criminal and 
civil justice process is ineffective in deterring or remedying prosecutorial 
misconduct.22
 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 415, 415 (2010); Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, 
129 S. Ct. 2002, 2002 (2009) (settled and dismissed after oral argument). 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. Warren Diepraam, Prosecutorial Misconduct:  It Is Not the Prosecutor’s Way, 47 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 773, 773 (2006); Joshua Marquis, Should It Be Easier to Sue Prosecutors for 
Misconduct?, CQ RESEARCHER, Nov. 9, 2007, at 953 (“Cases of intentional misconduct by 
prosecutors are about as frequent as the number of cases of human rabies.  For that very 
reason it’s big news when a district attorney engages in actual misconduct.”). But see D. 
Brooks Smith, Policing Prosecutors:  What Role Can Appellate Courts Play?, 38 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 835, 836 n.6 (2010) (Judge Smith, who serves on the Third Circuit, notes that 
“[e]xamples of prosecutorial misconduct are not uncommon” and that “[t]he list [of 
examples] is, unfortunately, lengthy.”). 
 21. See infra Part I.A. 
 22. See infra Part I.B. 
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A.  Prosecutorial Misconduct Is a Significant Problem 
As the 2009 report of the Justice Project observed, “prosecutorial 
misconduct was a factor in dismissed charges, reversed convictions, or 
reduced sentences in at least 2,012 cases since 1970.”23  From 1992–2011, 
using DNA evidence, the Innocence Project at Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law has exonerated 273 people who were wrongfully convicted24 
and has reported that prosecutorial misconduct is a leading cause of these 
wrongful convictions.25  One Innocence Project report concluded that 250 
innocent people exonerated by DNA evidence had served 3,160 years in 
prison.26  According to Northwestern University’s Center on Wrongful 
Convictions, about 50 people each year are exonerated in both DNA and 
non-DNA cases.27  The director of Cardozo Law School’s Jacob Burns 
Ethics Center reported that of 180 DNA exonerations, 43 percent involved 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.28
These conclusions are borne out by two recent California reports.  In 
2007, the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, 
established by the California State Senate to study ways to prevent 
wrongful convictions, issued its report.
 
29  The Commission found that in 
the preceding decade, California appellate courts found prosecutorial 
misconduct in 443 cases.30  Of these cases, the courts found the misconduct 
had been harmless in 390 cases, but had reversed convictions in 53 cases.31  
Most recently, in 2010, the Northern California Innocence Project released 
its study of prosecutorial misconduct,32 the most comprehensive review of 
state prosecutorial misconduct in the United States.33
 
 23. JOHN F. TERZANO ET AL., JUSTICE PROJECT, IMPROVING PROSECUTORIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY:  A POLICY REVIEW 2 (2009), available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/
JusticeProjectReport.pdf. 
  The Innocence 
Project reviewed more than 4,000 California state and federal appellate 
 24. Know the Cases, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 25. See EMILY M. WEST, INNOCENCE PROJECT, COURT FINDINGS OF PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT CLAIMS IN POST-CONVICTION APPEALS AND CIVIL SUITS AMONG THE FIRST 255 
DNA EXONERATION CASES 1 (2010), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/
docs/Innocence_Project_Pros_Misconduct.pdf; see also Johns, supra note 10, at 59–63 
(summarizing studies of wrongful convictions and prosecutorial misconduct). 
 26. INNOCENCE PROJECT, 250 EXONERATED:  TOO MANY WRONGFULLY CONVICTED 3 
(2010), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/InnocenceProject_250.pdf. 
 27. Kevin Davis, The Real World, ABA J., Jan. 2011, at 51, 53. 
 28. Panelists Examine Why Prosecutors Are Largely Ignored by Disciplinary Officials, 
74 U.S.L.W. 2526, 2526 (Mar. 7, 2006) (quoting Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky). 
 29. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
REPORTING MISCONDUCT 3 (2007), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/
reports/prosecutorial/official/OFFICIAL REPORT ON REPORTING MISCONDUCT.pdf. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See generally KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, N. CAL. INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, PREVENTABLE ERROR:  A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 
1997–2009 (2010), available at http://law.scu.edu/ncip/file/ProsecutorialMisconduct_
BookEntire_online version.pdf. 
 33. Id. at 2. 
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decisions between 1997–2009 alleging prosecutorial misconduct.34  The 
study found that in about 3,000 cases, the courts did not find prosecutorial 
misconduct; but that in 707 cases, the courts did find such misconduct.35  
Moreover, in another 282 cases, the courts did not resolve the question.36  
The finding of 707 cases of misconduct is significant—it equates to one 
case of prosecutorial misconduct each week in California alone.37  This 
study was followed up by an annual report for 2010 documenting 130 
judicial findings of prosecutorial misconduct in 102 cases, 26 of which 
resulted in reversals of convictions, orders for new trial, or orders barring 
prosecution evidence.38
But these reports grossly underestimate the instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct for several reasons.  First, only about 3 percent of felony cases 
actually go to trial, so there will be no judicial scrutiny of 97 percent of 
cases, almost all of which are resolved through guilty pleas.
 
39  Second, for 
the first five years of the eleven-year study, more than 90 percent of the 
California appellate decisions were not entered into legal databases.40  
Third, findings of misconduct at the trial court level (but not discussed in 
appellate decisions) are inaccessible.41  Finally, the numbers fail to reflect 
the instances of prosecutorial misconduct that were never discovered or 
appealed.42
The failure to discover prosecutorial misconduct is especially likely in 
cases of Brady violations.
 
43  In 1963, the Supreme Court held that 
prosecutors have the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to defendants.44  
But the failure to do so is a prevalent example of prosecutorial 
misconduct.45
 
 34. Id. 
  As the Innocence Project observed: 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.  In many of these cases, the court declined to review the claim of misconduct 
because defense counsel had failed to object to the misconduct at trial. Id. at 38, 40. 
 37. Id. at 2. 
 38. MAURICE POSSLEY & JESSICA SEARGEANT, N. CAL. INNONCENCE PROJECT, FIRST 
ANNUAL REPORT:  PREVENTABLE ERROR—PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 
2010, at 3 (2011), available at http://www.veritasinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/
ProsecutorialMisconduct_FirstAnnual_Final8.pdf. 
 39. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 3. 
 40. Id. at 10–11. 
 41. Id. at 3. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 
U.S. 409, 443–44 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (“The judicial process will by definition be 
ignorant of the [Brady] violation when it occurs; and it is reasonable to suspect that most 
such violations never surface.  It is all the more important, then, to deter such violations by 
permitting damage actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to be maintained in instances where 
violations do surface.”). 
 44. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86. 
 45. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 36–38, 65.  A study of all 5,760 capital 
convictions in the United States found that 16 percent of reversals in post-conviction 
proceedings were for Brady violations. Id. at 37.  The California Innocence Project study 
found 66 cases of Brady violations. Id.  Indeed, of the six instances of discipline for 
prosecutorial misconduct from 1997–2009, all six involved Brady violations. Id. at 55.  
Other instances of Brady violations escaped any discipline. Id. at 55–56. But see Rachel E. 
Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 
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When prosecutors make the decision as to whether evidence is Brady 
material, their belief that the defendant is guilty can create a distorting 
prism through which they tend to view the evidence inaccurately as a red 
herring or irrelevant.  Brady violations are, by their nature, difficult to 
uncover; they become apparent only when the withheld material becomes 
known in other ways.46
For these reasons, Brady violations often go undetected.
 
47  For example, 
in one recent California case,48 the Court of Appeal reversed a defendant’s 
conviction for child molestation because the deputy district attorney 
withheld a videotape of the victim’s medical exam supporting the defense 
expert’s conclusion that no sexual assault had occurred.49  The discovery of 
that one undisclosed videotape led to the discovery of more than 3,000 
other videotapes that had never been turned over to other defendants.50
While the frequency of prosecutorial misconduct is difficult to determine, 
the fact of prosecutorial misconduct imposes extraordinary costs and 
consequences on the criminal justice system.  First, of course, are the 
 
 
2092 (2010) (explaining the reasons an honest prosecutor may fail to disclose exculpatory 
evidence). 
 46. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 36.  Because Brady violations are so difficult 
to discover and police, scholars have suggested various preventative and corrective reforms. 
See Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 499 (2009) 
(explaining that the Brady materiality requirement leads to the systematic under-disclosure 
of exculpatory evidence and proposing a prophylactic open-file rule); Sara Gurwitch, When 
Self-Policing Does Not Work:  A Proposal for Policing Prosecutors in Their Obligation to 
Provide Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 303, 320–21 (2010) 
(arguing that the indictment should be dismissed in cases where willful Brady violations 
have prejudiced the defendant). 
 47. The hidden nature of Brady violations is especially problematic. See Barkow, supra 
note 45, at 2092–94.  In many other categories of prosecutorial misconduct, the misconduct 
occurs in open court where defense counsel and the trial court have an opportunity to 
observe and correct the misconduct, and the appellate court has an opportunity to review it 
based on the trial court record.  These categories of misconduct include 
eliciting inadmissible evidence in witness examination; vouching for a witness’s 
truthfulness; testifying for an absent witness; misstating the law; arguing facts not 
in evidence; mischaracterizing evidence; shifting the burden of proof; impugning 
the defense; arguing inconsistent theories of prosecution; appealing to religious 
authority; offering personal opinion; [and] engaging in discriminatory jury 
selection . . . . 
RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 25. 
 48. People v. Uribe, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 829 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 49. Id. at 846–47. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 20 (citing Tracey Kaplan, 
Sex Abuse Conviction Dismissed, DA Berated Citing “Numerous Acts of Misconduct,” 
Judge Orders Man Freed After Serving Four Years of a Possible Life Sentence, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 7, 2010, at 1A).  On remand, the case was dismissed; the dismissal in 
now on appeal. Id. 
 50. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32 (citing Tracey Kaplan, Judge Orders New 
Trial in Second Case as Before, Tape of Exam Wasn’t Given to Defense, SAN JOSE MERCURY 
NEWS, Oct. 30, 2009, at 1B).  Another example is the case of Alan Gell who was exonerated 
after “nine years in prison and half of that on death row” for murder. See Robert P. 
Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong:  
The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 263 
(2008).  Prosecutors withheld witness statements that the victim was seen alive after Gell 
was with him and that they were creating stories to disguise their own involvement. Id. at 
264–65. 
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devastating consequences for the innocent person wrongfully convicted as a 
result of prosecutorial misconduct.  Simply put, their lives are ruined.  
Many have spent years in prison before being exonerated.51  Many innocent 
people are currently in prison who have yet to be—and may never be—
exonerated.  Innocent people in prison lose their freedom, their ties to 
family and friends, their employment, their educational opportunities and 
job skills, and often their physical and mental health.52
Crime victims and their families also suffer as a result of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Enduring the lengthy appellate process, reversals of 
convictions, and retrials is emotionally wrenching.  Where the defendant is 
exonerated, the victim knows that the criminal perpetrator has escaped 
justice and is likely still at large.  And even where the prosecutorial 
misconduct does not result in exoneration, the prosecutor’s case has often 
been undermined by the passage of time; the ultimate sentence of the 
defendant will often be reduced through a plea bargain since the prosecutor 
will be unable to retry the case.
 
53
Where prosecutorial misconduct has caused the wrongful conviction of 
innocent people, the danger to public safety is obvious:  the real criminals 
remain free to commit other crimes.  Specifically, in cases of DNA 
exonerations, authorities have found that many of the true criminals 
committed other crimes while innocent people were incarcerated for their 
original crimes.
 
54  A horrifying example is the case of Kevin Green.55  In 
1980, Green was wrongfully convicted for assaulting his pregnant wife and 
murdering her unborn baby.56  He served sixteen years in prison until he 
was exonerated.57  By that time, the police had discovered that the real 
criminal was Gerald Parker, who had committed five murders before the 
attack on Green’s wife.58  While Green was being wrongfully prosecuted 
and convicted, Parker continued to commit violent crimes, including raping 
a thirteen-year-old girl.59
As the Innocence Project study found, prosecutorial misconduct burdens 
taxpayers in several ways.  First, prolonged criminal prosecutions—
sometimes lasting decades through appeals and retrials—are enormously 
expensive.
 
60
 
 51. Know the Cases:  Browse Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/know/Browse-Profiles.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (documenting all the cases 
of exoneration by DNA evidence). 
  Second, the cost of incarcerating defendants through lengthy 
 52. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 66; Adam I. Kaplan, Comment, The Case 
for Comparative Fault in Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, 56 UCLA L. REV. 227, 
232 (2008); see also Janet Roberts & Elizabeth Stanton, A Long Road Back After 
Exoneration, and Justice Is Slow to Make Amends, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at 38. 
 53. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 70. 
 54. Id. at 71. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 67–68.  In one case—which has been litigated for thirty years—a defendant 
was granted a retrial on murder charges because the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory 
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prosecutions—as well as the cost of incarcerating innocent people who are 
wrongfully convicted—is substantial.  In California, incarceration costs 
$45,000 per year per inmate.61  In addition, the taxpayers may be liable for 
damages in civil lawsuits62 and under wrongful imprisonment statutes.63
Finally, prosecutorial misconduct erodes the integrity of, and public 
confidence in, the criminal justice system as a whole.
 
64  The undermining 
of the public’s confidence is exacerbated by the fact that minorities and the 
poor suffer the most from prosecutorial misconduct.65  In our system, the 
prosecutor “is the representative . . . of a sovereignty whose . . . interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that 
justice shall be done.”66
Prosecutorial misconduct is wrong.  It is not excusable as a means to 
convict the guilty, and it is abhorrent in the conviction of the innocent.  It 
has no place in a criminal justice system that strives to be fair, to 
accurately convict the guilty and to protect the innocent.  It undercuts the 
public trust and impugns the reputations of the majority of prosecutors, 
who uphold the law and live up to their obligations to seek justice.
  As the Innocence Project observed: 
67
B.  Existing Deterrent and Remedial Mechanisms Are Ineffective 
 
In 1976, when the Supreme Court adopted absolute prosecutorial 
immunity, it concluded that the burden and distraction of potential civil 
liability was not warranted because other deterrent and remedial 
mechanisms would be adequate to safeguard the accused’s rights.68  
Specifically, the Court pointed to “the remedial powers of the trial judge, 
appellate review, and state and federal post-conviction collateral 
remedies”;69 the prospect of professional discipline;70 and the potential 
criminal liability of prosecutors for violating the accused’s rights.71
 
evidence and introduced false evidence. Id. at 68.  The cost of prosecution has exceeded $1 
million. Id. 
  But as 
 61. Id. at 68. 
 62. Id. at 66.  While establishing civil liability is extremely difficult because of the 
immunity doctrine, if immunity can be overcome, potential liability can be very high. Id. at 
66, 68–70. 
 63. Id. at 70. 
 64. Id. at 71. 
 65. JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE:  WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO 
MAKE IT RIGHT 318 (2003) (explaining that prosecutorial misconduct happens more 
frequently in the conviction of black men); Arthur L. Rizer III, The Race Effect on Wrongful 
Convictions, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 845, 856–58 (2003); Ephraim Unell, Note, A Right 
Not to Be Framed:  Preserving Civil Liability of Prosecutors in the Face of Absolute 
Immunity, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 955, 956–57 (2010). 
 66. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 67. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 6. 
 68. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425–29 (1976); see also Burns v. Reed, 500 
U.S. 478, 492 (1991) (“‘[T]he safeguards built into the judicial system tend to reduce the 
need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978))). 
 69. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427. 
 70. Id. at 428–29. 
 71. Id. 
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the following discussion will explain, these deterrent and corrective 
mechanisms are entirely inadequate. 
First, the courts’ remedial powers are not available in the 97 percent of 
cases that never go to trial, so the protections of trial and appellate court 
scrutiny are only available in 3 percent of cases.72  Moreover, even when 
prosecutorial misconduct is found by the courts of appeals, the offense is 
found to be harmless in most of those cases, so the conviction stands.  In 
fact, for the 707 cases in California where prosecutorial misconduct was 
found to have been committed, the appellate courts found the error to be 
harmless and upheld the conviction in nearly 80 percent of the cases.73
In his article outlining the limited ability of appellate courts to police 
prosecutorial misconduct, Judge D. Brooks Smith of the Third Circuit 
described the doctrine of harmless error as “the elephant in the room.”
 
74  A 
finding of “harmless error” is not equivalent to a finding of trivial error.75  
Indeed, harmless error cases often reveal serious prosecutorial 
misconduct.76  For example, in one California case, the court found 
harmless error despite the prosecutor’s repeated and persistent misconduct 
in pursuing an improper line of questioning.77  In the court’s view, the 
prosecutor “instilled a poison which the defense could not drain from the 
case.”78  But the conviction was, nonetheless, affirmed.  The Innocence 
Project study documents a number of cases where egregious misconduct 
was found to be harmless.79
Moreover, in cases of harmless error, professional discipline also fails to 
punish or deter misconduct in many states.  For example, in California, a 
court is only required to report prosecutorial misconduct where there is a 
reversal or modification of the judgment as a result of the misconduct.
  When they label such prosecutorial 
misconduct as harmless error, the trial and appellate courts neither deter nor 
remedy that misconduct. 
80
 
 72. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 
  
The majority of the 707 instances of misconduct found by the Innocence 
Project were not required to be reported because 548 of them were not 
32, at 10. 
 73. Id. at 12–13. 
 74. Smith, supra note 20, at 836–40 (“The nature of harmless error review and 
concomitant limitations on our supervisory authority profoundly limit the reach of a court of 
appeals when it confronts most claims of prosecutorial misconduct.”). 
 75. Harmless error is found where the court finds that despite the constitutional error, an 
automatic reversal of the conviction is not constitutionally required; harmful error is found 
where the error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice because “‘it is reasonably probable 
that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of 
the error.’” RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 19 (quoting People v. Watson, 299 P.2d 
243, 254 (Cal. 1956)).  This is a high hurdle to overcome since a showing that the error may 
well have influenced the outcome is insufficient. 
 76. Id. at 21–23, 26–28, 31, 36–37. 
 77. See People v. McKenzie, No. A112837, 2007 WL 2193548, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Aug. 1, 2007); RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 21. 
 78. McKenzie, 2007 WL 2193548, at *8. 
 79. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 22–24. 
 80. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6086.7 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); RIDOLFI & 
POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 22. 
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covered by the limited statutory reporting requirement.81  Indeed, in the 
thirteen-year period covered by the study, there were no reports of 
discipline for any of those 548 instances, all of which were found to be 
harmless error.82
In a number of cases where prosecutorial misconduct was found to be 
harmless, the accused were in fact innocent.
 
83  In a 2010 study of persons 
exonerated by DNA evidence, the issue of prosecutorial misconduct had 
been raised in sixty-five of them, but rejected in thirty-four of them.84  In 
the thirty-one cases where the courts found prosecutorial misconduct, it was 
found to be harmless in nineteen cases.85  Of these sixty-five cases of 
wrongful convictions, only twelve found harmful error.86
The failure of the courts or disciplinary bodies to deter or remedy 
prosecutorial misconduct is equally apparent in cases where harmful error is 
found.
  Yet all sixty-five 
of these people were actually innocent. 
87  Despite their statutory obligation to report prosecutorial 
misconduct in cases of harmful error, judges routinely ignore their 
responsibility.  Specifically, California judges are required to report 
prosecutorial misconduct that results in reversals,88 but a review of thirty 
cases in which convictions had been reversed for prosecutorial misconduct 
revealed that not a single one had been reported to the state bar.89  
Moreover, from 1997–2009, appellate courts found 159 instances of 
harmful prosecutorial misconduct,90 but only six prosecutors were 
disciplined for misconduct during criminal proceedings.91
The lack of discipline for prosecutorial misconduct is remarkable.  In 
California, attorneys were publicly disciplined 4,741 times from 1997–
2009.
 
92  But only ten instances of public discipline involved prosecutors, 
and only six of those cases involved the handling of a criminal case.93
 
 81. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 
  To 
put those numbers in perspective, appellate courts found prosecutorial 
32, at 48. 
 82. Id. at 22, 48. 
 83. Id. at 64. 
 84. Id. at 65. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Barkow, supra note 45, at 2095 (explaining that a nationwide study of all reported 
cases found only twenty-seven where prosecutors were disciplined for unethical behavior 
that compromised the fairness of a trial (citing Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional 
Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 751 tbl.VI, 753 tbl.VII (2001))). 
 88. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6086.7 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011). 
 89. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 49 (citing CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR 
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT (Gerald Uelmen ed., 2008), available at 
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf); see also Barkow, supra note 45, at 
2096 (providing some reasons why judges may be reluctant to report prosecutors to 
disciplinary bodies); Pamela A. MacLean, Sins of Omission, CAL. LAW., Aug. 2009, at 26, 
26–30 (discussing the commission findings of misconduct, failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence, and a failure to report prosecutorial misconduct). 
 90. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 18. 
 91. Id. at 16. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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misconduct in over 700 criminal cases, but only six prosecutors were 
disciplined.94  In other words, less than 1 percent of the prosecutors 
formally found to have engaged in misconduct faced any professional 
sanction for it.95
Even where prosecutors were repeatedly found to have engaged in 
prosecutorial misconduct, they were still not reported or disciplined.
 
96  The 
Innocence Project report found sixty-seven prosecutors whom appellate 
courts had found to have committed misconduct repeatedly—some as many 
as five times, but only a few were disciplined.97  There is a certain irony in 
this lack of discipline of those charged with enforcing the law:  prosecutors 
escape discipline while non-prosecutors are vigorously disciplined.98  For 
example, one attorney was suspended for twenty months for bouncing a 
check in his personal account,99 and a criminal defense attorney was 
suspended for two years for crossing the line between zealous advocacy and 
contempt of court.100  But deputy district attorney Rosalie Morton was 
never disciplined even though she was repeatedly found to have engaged in 
prosecutorial misconduct, resulting in the reversal of three convictions 
under the harmful error standard.101
Putting recent findings in historical context, the lack of professional 
discipline is clear.  Prior to 2005 in California—the largest bar association 
in the United States
 
102—“not a single prosecutor was disciplined for 
[mis]conduct in a criminal case.”103  And, “to date, no California prosecutor 
has been disbarred for prosecutorial misconduct.”104  In 1976, the Supreme 
Court confidently asserted, “[A] prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among 
officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his 
amenability to professional discipline by an association of his peers.”105  In 
2011, we know that this is simply not true.  In reality, prosecutors who 
engage in misconduct—even when found to have engaged in misconduct by 
courts of appeals—are subject to discipline less than 1 percent of the 
time.106
In the past few years, two cases have spotlighted the issue of 
prosecutorial misconduct:  the Duke Lacrosse case and the Ted Stevens 
case.  In 2007, in the Duke Lacrosse case, the prosecuting attorney was 
disbarred for misconduct in withholding exculpatory evidence and making 
inflammatory public statements.
 
107
 
 94. Id. 
  Specifically, despite repeated requests 
 95. Id. at 3. 
 96. Id. at 57–58. 
 97. Id. at 3, 57. 
 98. Id. at 59–60. 
 99. Id. at 59. 
 100. Id. at 59–60. 
 101. Id. at 60. 
 102. Id. at 54. 
 103. Id. at 56. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976). 
 106. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 3. 
 107. TERZANO ET AL., supra note 23, at 9. 
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from defense counsel, the prosecutor failed to disclose reports of DNA 
testing that indicated that the DNA evidence found on the rape victim did 
not match that of the three defendants in the case.108  Withholding 
exonerating evidence is one of the most common types of prosecutorial 
misconduct.109  What is unusual is that the state bar acted quickly and 
decisively to punish the prosecutor.110
In 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder dismissed an indictment against 
former Senator Ted Stevens because of prosecutorial misconduct.
 
111  
Again, as in the Duke Lacrosse case, the prosecutors repeatedly failed to 
provide evidence to defense counsel despite court orders to do so.112  
Attorney General Holder ordered an internal review of the prosecutors’ 
conduct, and the trial judge handling the case appointed its own prosecutor 
to investigate whether the government prosecutors should face criminal 
contempt charges.113  He stated that “[i]n twenty-five years on the bench I 
have never seen anything approaching the mishandling and misconduct that 
I have seen in this case.”114  Again, unfortunately, the response of Attorney 
General Holder and Judge Emmett Sullivan in addressing the misconduct is 
more remarkable than the misconduct itself.115
The possibility of criminal consequences is the last remedy cited by the 
Supreme Court in determining that civil rights liability is unnecessary to 
deter prosecutorial misconduct.
 
116  This theoretical deterrent is in practice 
nonexistent.  The Court pointed out that government officials, including 
prosecutors, can be criminally prosecuted for violating constitutional 
protections under 18 U.S.C. § 242.117  But it failed to cite a single case 
where prosecutors had actually been held criminally liable.118  In fact, in 
the 150 years since its adoption in 1866,119 it appears that only one 
prosecutor has been convicted under this statute.120
 
 108. Id. 
 
 109. Id. at 2, 9. 
 110. Id. at 9. 
 111. Id. at 12. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (alteration in original). 
 115. Id. at 2, 12. 
 116. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428–29 (1976). 
 117. Id. at 429. 
 118. See id. 
 119. Section 242 was originally adopted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See ch. 
31, 14 Stat. 27, 27.  It was readopted after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment as part 
of the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180–85 (1961); see also 
Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will the 
Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5, 7 (1985). 
 120. Brophy v. Comm. on Prof’l Standards, 442 N.Y.S.2d 818, 818 (App. Div. 1981); see 
Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations:  A 
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 703 n.56, 726 (1987); Smith, supra note 20, at 840 
(observing that the Supreme Court’s reminder that criminal prosecution was available for 
prosecutorial misconduct “seems small comfort to an appeals court that confronts 
prosecutorial wrongdoing, the lion’s share of which does not rise to the level of a criminal 
offense”). 
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In short, despite the Supreme Court’s confidence in 1976 that existing 
legal mechanisms were sufficient to offset the dangers of granting 
prosecutors absolute immunity,121 current studies have established that 
existing safeguards and remedies are totally inadequate.  First, since 97 
percent of the cases never go to trial, 97 percent of defendants lack the 
protections of trial court supervision, appellate review, and collateral 
proceedings.122
II.  ABSOLUTE PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY IS HISTORICALLY UNJUSTIFIED 
  Second, many instances of prosecutorial misconduct—
including Brady violations—are extremely difficult to uncover and never 
come to light in court proceedings.  Third, even where cases go to trial and 
prosecutorial misconduct is established on appeal, it is rarely found to 
constitute harmful—and therefore reversible—error.  Fourth, even where 
prosecutorial misconduct is found on appeal to constitute harmful and 
reversible error, it is rarely reported to disciplinary bodies.  Prosecutors are 
almost never subjected to professional discipline—even where the 
misconduct constitutes harmful error.  And finally, criminal prosecutions 
for prosecutorial misconduct virtually never happen. 
In litigation under the major federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
prosecutors enjoy either absolute or qualified immunity depending on the 
function they are performing at the time of their alleged misconduct.123  
When acting as advocates, prosecutors receive absolute immunity even 
when they have acted intentionally and maliciously.124  When acting as 
investigators or administrators, prosecutors receive qualified immunity, 
which protects them from liability unless they violated clearly established 
law of which a reasonable prosecutor would have known.125
Section 1983—section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act—was adopted in 1871 
to provide a federal civil remedy for civil rights violations.  The Court has 
repeatedly held that § 1983 must be interpreted in light of its historical 
context.  While noting that § 1983’s text provides for no immunities, the 
Court has concluded that Congress intended to preserve the well-established 
common law immunities that existed when the statute was enacted.
  In adopting 
this scheme, the Supreme Court relied heavily on historical justifications.  
This section explains that the Court’s historical justification for recognizing 
absolute prosecutorial immunity is just plain wrong. 
126  But 
the Court has stressed that when “a tradition of absolute immunity did not 
exist as of 1871, we have refused to grant such immunity under § 1983.”127
 
 121. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425–29. 
  
Moreover, because the undisputed purpose of § 1983 was to create liability 
 122. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 10. 
 123. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127–29 (1997); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 
U.S. 259, 268–69 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991). 
 124. See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 124; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427. 
 125. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–70. 
 126. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1951) (upholding legislative 
immunity). 
 127. Burns, 500 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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for unlawful conduct of state officials, the Court has always emphasized 
that it would confer absolute immunity sparingly.128
The common law as of 1871 did not confer absolute immunity for 
prosecutorial misconduct.  Indeed, no court adopted absolute prosecutorial 
immunity until 1896—twenty-five years after the adoption of § 1983.
 
129  In 
fact, in 1871, although the office of the public prosecutor existed, the 
private prosecution of crimes was widespread,130 and both public and 
private prosecutors were liable for malicious prosecution.131  Indeed, as one 
court observed, it was especially appropriate and necessary to hold 
prosecutors liable for malicious prosecutions given their power and the 
need to hold them accountable for the abuse of that power.132
Although the common law did not provide absolute immunity for persons 
responsible for a criminal prosecution, prosecutors were protected from 
excessive liability because the elements of the cause of action were difficult 
to prove.  To establish a claim for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff had to 
prove that the prosecutor acted without probable cause and with malice.
 
133  
This high bar for liability served the policy of encouraging persons to act as 
private prosecutors to protect the community.  Given the burdens of proof, 
an action for malicious prosecution essentially incorporated the elements of 
qualified immunity.134  If the plaintiff satisfied the heavy burden of proof, 
however, the plaintiff would “ordinarily be handsomely rewarded. . . . [for] 
the outrageous character of the defendant’s conduct.”135
While the common law in 1871 allowed tort actions against prosecutors 
for malicious prosecution, this remedy was meaningless in the South 
following the Civil War because the former Confederate states were 
aggressively using civil and criminal prosecutions to obstruct federal 
 
 
 128. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 434 (White, J., concurring) (“[T]o extend absolute immunity 
to any [class] of state officials is to negate pro tanto the very remedy which it appears 
Congress sought to create.”). 
 129. See Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001, 1001–02 (Ind. 1896) (holding that a 
prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity); see also Burns, 500 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 130. See Johns, supra note 10, at 108–14. 
 131. Id. at 113; see Parker v. Huntington, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 124, 127–28 (1854) (holding 
that where plaintiff accused the District Attorney and another defendant of lying to the court 
to obtain his indictment for perjury, “[t]he plaintiff can maintain his case by proof of a 
malicious prosecution by both or either of the defendants”). 
 132. Wood v. Weir, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 544, 547 (1845) (“It is contended, that this rule 
[recognizing liability for malicious prosecution] will expose attorneys to perplexing 
litigation, to the manifest injury of the profession.  If it should, the law knows no distinction 
of persons; a different rule cannot, as to them, be recognized by this Court, from that which 
is applicable to others.  Besides, this is a numerous class, powerful for good or evil, and 
holding them to a strict accountability, will have the effect to exalt and dignify the 
profession, by purging it of ignorant, meretricious and reckless members.”). 
 133. 1 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 480–81 (1859); see 3 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *126; MARTIN L. NEWELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, FALSE IMPRISONMENT, AND THE ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCESS 21–
22 (1892); Fowler Harper, Malicious Prosecution, False Imprisonment and Defamation, 15 
TEX. L. REV. 157, 165–70 (1937). 
 134. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 133 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 135. Harper, supra note 133, at 170. 
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enforcement of civil rights.  During Reconstruction, Congress sought to 
restructure the nation by eliminating slavery,136 granting former slaves 
citizenship,137 and providing effective redress for the deprivation of civil 
rights.138  But this effort met fierce and violent resistance.139  Former 
Confederates seized control in many parts of the South and launched 
aggressive campaigns against newly freed slaves, Republicans, Union 
supporters, and federal officials.140  These anti-Reconstruction campaigns 
included state-sanctioned criminal prosecutions of Union officers and 
federal officials for attempting to enforce federal laws.141
Southern states used their judicial systems to frustrate Reconstruction and 
intimidate federal officers.  Federal officials often were criminally 
prosecuted for arresting southern violators of the Civil Rights Acts.
 
142  
Southern prosecutors also targeted Union military commanders and 
officials of the Freedmen’s Bureau who sought to enforce the 1866 Civil 
Rights Act.143  News of these malicious prosecutions reached the highest 
officials in Washington.  For example, in 1866, United States Attorney 
Benjamin H. Bristow wrote to Attorney General James Speed to explain 
that, in the South, state prosecutions were being initiated against Union 
supporters and federal officials in an apparently concerted attempt to force 
them to leave the state.144  In Kentucky, as one newspaper explained, 
Confederates and their sympathizers “have possession of the courts; they 
constitute the juries; they are legislators, judges, magistrates, sheriffs, 
constables, jurors, and with the spirit of disloyalty, they intend to take 
vengeance upon those who have been zealous in the cause of the Union.”145
 
 136. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A 
BIOGRAPHY 358–59 (2005). 
  
General John M. Palmer, the Union military commander in Kentucky, 
 137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; AMAR, supra note 136, at 380–81. 
 138. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)); 
AMAR, supra note 136, at 362, 381. 
 139. Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority:  Jim Crow and the 
Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 88–89 (2008); James 
Forman, Jr., Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century, 113 YALE L.J. 895, 914–26 (2004); 
Russell Glazer, Comment, The Sherman Amendment:  Congressional Rejection of 
Communal Liability for Civil Rights Violations, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1371, 1371–73 (1992); 
Eric A. Harrington, Note, Judicial Misuse of History and § 1983:  Toward a Purpose-Based 
Approach, 85 TEX. L. REV. 999, 1004–06 (2007). 
 140. AMAR, supra note 136, at 377–78; Chin & Wagner, supra note 139, at 88–89; 
Forman, supra note 139, at 914–26; Glazer, supra note 139, at 1371–73; Harrington, supra 
note 139, at 1004–06. 
 141. See S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 39-2, at 5 (1865) (describing groups of “incorrigibles” who 
“persecute Union men and negroes whenever they can do so with impunity”); David 
Achtenberg, With Malice Toward Some:  United States v. Kirby, Malicious Prosecution, and 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 273, 275 (1995). 
 142. See ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION:  THE 
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866–1876, at 23 (2005). 
 143. See 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY:  A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 441 (2d ed. 2002) (describing reports of 
“countless” lawsuits by Southerners against federal officials). 
 144. See Achtenberg, supra note 141, at 329. 
 145. Id. at 298. 
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wrote directly to Attorney General Speed to relate that he had repeatedly 
been indicted for “aiding slaves escape” merely because he had issued 
travel passes to former slaves.146  As he explained, “there are twenty 
thousand crimes for which I am punishable and Congress will have to pass 
a law extending my life—lengthen it out a few thousand years that I may 
[serve] this punishment.”147  More than three thousand prosecutions were 
brought in Kentucky alone against former Union soldiers.148
In response to this flood of prosecutions, General Ulysses S. Grant issued 
an order forbidding state courts from prosecuting federal officials for 
actions taken within the scope of their authorized duties.
 
149  The Order 
further sought to curb state prosecutors’ abuse of the judicial system by 
requiring them to treat freed slaves in the “same manner and degree” as 
every other citizen.150  These abuses of the judicial system were so 
pervasive that, as part of the first Civil Rights Act, Congress gave federal 
authorities the power to take control of state criminal prosecutions if a fair 
result could not be achieved.151  During the first year this law was in effect, 
the Commissioner of the Freedman’s Bureau, the agency charged with 
handling the administration of cases removed from state court, estimated 
that their courts handled 100,000 complaints concerning abusive state 
actions.152
Congress, too, was well aware of Southern prosecutors’ aggressive abuse 
of the judicial process.  During the debates on the 1866 amendments to the 
Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, Senator Lyman Trumbull, Chair of the 
Judiciary Committee, urged action because “thousands” of “loyal men” 
were subjected to baseless civil and criminal prosecutions.
 
153  As Congress 
debated the Civil Rights Act of 1866, representatives expressed concern 
about the vexatious use of prosecutions against Union supporters and 
federal officials.154
 
 146. Id. at 299. 
  In recommending the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction stated: 
 147. Id. 
 148. See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2054 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Wilson) 
(attributing the numerous prosecutions to Kentucky’s refusal to transfer such cases to federal 
court). 
 149. See General Grant’s Orders, General Orders, No. 3, War Dep’t, Adjunct General’s 
Office, Washington, D.C., (Jan. 12, 1866), reprinted in EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 122–23 
(Washington, Solomons & Chapman 2d ed. 1875). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27. 
 152. See PATRICIA ALLAN LUCIE, FREEDOM AND FEDERALISM:  CONGRESS AND COURTS 
1861–1866, at 166 (1986). 
 153. See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1983 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull).  Senator 
Trumbull knew the common law of his time, including that prosecutors could be liable for 
their actions in tort.  During his service as a Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court, he wrote 
an opinion holding that “the law secures every person from unfounded arrests, maliciously 
instituted against him without probable cause.” Jacks v. Stimpson, 13 Ill. 701, 704 (1852). 
 154. See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2065 (remarks of Sen. Doolittle) 
(describing the widespread nature of the problem of unfounded prosecutions against federal 
officials); see also Achtenberg, supra note 141, at 338–42 (“[F]or the 39th Congress, the 
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Southern men who adhered to the Union are bitterly hated and relentlessly 
persecuted.  In some localities prosecutions have been instituted in State 
courts against Union officers for acts done in the line of official duty, and 
similar prosecutions are threatened elsewhere as soon as the United States 
troops are removed.155
To counter this anti-Union resistance, Congress sought a way to hold 
hostile Southern officials accountable.  In April 1866, Congress passed the 
Civil Rights Act, which provided for criminal penalties against any person 
who caused the deprivation of the rights of former slaves.
 
156  But the 
violence continued unabated.157  Therefore, Congress—buttressed by the 
constitutional authority of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was ratified 
in 1868—expanded the scope of the 1866 Act by adding the civil liability 
provision of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, which prohibited any person 
from depriving any citizen of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured 
by the Constitution.158
This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty and 
human rights.  All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such 
statutes are liberally and beneficently construed. . . . [T]he largest latitude 
consistent with the words employed is uniformly given in construing such 
statutes and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and defend 
and give remedies for their wrongs to all the people.
  These remedial provisions were intended to be 
broadly construed.  Thus, Representative Shellabarger declared: 
159
As this history shows, when § 1983 was adopted in 1871, the common 
law did not recognize absolute prosecutorial immunity.  In fact, prosecutors 
were liable in common law tort actions for malicious prosecution.  
Moreover, in adopting the Ku Klux Klan Act, Congress was addressing the 
widespread practice in the South of using civil and criminal prosecutions to 
thwart Reconstruction and the enforcement of federal civil rights laws.  
 
 
problem of baseless prosecutions . . . was a pressing current crisis that provoked vigorous 
debate and decisive legislative action.”). 
 155. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. xvii–
xviii (1866). 
 156. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. 
 157. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:  AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION:  1863–
1877, at 342 (1988) (quoting the former Governor of Louisiana as complaining in October 
1866 that “murder and intimidation are the order of the day in this state”). 
 158. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983).  The 1871 Act also included criminal penalties for conspiring to violate civil rights, 
authorized the President to send military forces to suppress violence aimed at depriving civil 
rights of citizens and other persons, and authorized the suspension of habeas corpus for a 
limited time. Id. §§ 2–4, 17 Stat. at 13–15. 
 159. CONG. GLOBE, 42ND CONG., 1ST SESS. APP’X 68 (1871); see also id. at 217 (remarks 
of Sen. Thurman) (expressing his opposition by remarking that “there is no limitation 
whatsoever upon the terms that are employed [in § 1983], and they are as comprehensive as 
can be used”); CONG. GLOBE, 42ND CONG., 1ST SESS. 800 (remarks of Rep. Perry) (“Now, by 
our action on this bill we have asserted as fully as we can assert the mischief intended to be 
remedied.”); id. at 476 (remarks of Rep. Dawes) (the person who “invades, trenches upon, or 
impairs one iota or tittle of the least of [constitutional rights], to that extent trenches upon the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, and this Constitution authorizes us to bring him 
before the courts to answer therefor”). 
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State tort actions for malicious prosecution were meaningless in the face of 
this abuse of power, so a federal remedy was required.  Congress did not 
intend to insulate Southern prosecutors from liability for these abusive 
practices; on the contrary, it intended to provide a federal civil rights 
remedy against them for prosecutorial misconduct.  In 1871, Congress did 
not intend to provide immunity for prosecutorial misconduct, but rather 
intended to create a federal remedy establishing prosecutorial liability. 
Indeed, while prosecutors were liable for malicious prosecution when 
§ 1983 was adopted in 1871, the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial 
immunity was unheard of for another twenty-five years, until a state court 
in Indiana adopted it in Griffith v. Slinkard.160  Even after Griffith, the 
common law regarding absolute prosecutorial immunity was not settled for 
decades.  For example, while Indiana adopted the doctrine in 1896, the next 
year Kentucky concluded that prosecutors could be liable if they acted with 
malice or corrupt motives.161  This split in authority persisted into the 
1920s.162  California rejected absolute prosecutorial immunity in 1908,163 
and Hawaii held that a public prosecutor could be liable for malicious 
prosecution and rejected the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity in 
1916.164  Oregon waffled a bit and then accepted the doctrine in 1924.165  In 
the federal system, absolute prosecutorial immunity was not recognized 
until 1927.166  In other words, absolute prosecutorial immunity was not well 
established in 1871 and was not generally adopted until fifty years after the 
enactment of § 1983. 
In 1871 Congress could not have intended to retain a common law rule 
that did not yet exist.167  And it certainly did not intend to insulate 
prosecutors from liability for malicious prosecutions, since that was one of 
the tactics of southern defiance to Reconstruction that the Ku Klux Klan 
Act was intended to remedy.  To the extent that the doctrine of absolute 
 
 160. 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896). 
 161. Arnold v. Hubble, 38 S.W. 1041, 1041 (Ky. Ct. App. 1897). 
 162. Douglas J. McNamara, Buckley, Imbler and Stare Decisis:  The Present 
Predicament of Prosecutorial Immunity and an End to Its Absolute Means, 59 ALB. L. REV. 
1135, 1169 (1996). See generally Annotation, Immunity of Prosecuting Officer from Action 
for Malicious Prosecution, 34 A.L.R. 1504 (1925) (recognizing the split in authority and 
collecting cases); Note, The Civil Liability of a District Attorney for Quasi-judicial Acts, 73 
U. PA. L. REV. 300 (1925). 
 163. Carpenter v. Sibley, 94 P. 879, 879 (Cal. 1908). 
 164. Leong Yau v. Carden, 23 Haw. 362, 369 (1916). 
 165. Oregon Supreme Court decisions provide perhaps the best example of how unsettled 
the question of absolute immunity for prosecutors was for more than fifty years after 1871.  
In 1924, that court, sitting en banc, refused to grant a prosecutor absolute immunity, holding 
that a prosecutor who with intention falsely accused someone of a crime could be held liable 
in tort. Watts v. Gerking, 222 P. 318, 321 (Or. 1924) (en banc).  Months later, on re-
argument, a divided court reversed itself, withdrew its earlier decision, and held that the 
prosecutor was protected by absolute immunity for the exercise of his quasi-judicial position. 
Watts v. Gerking, 228 P. 135, 141 (Or. 1924) (en banc). 
 166. See generally Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927). 
 167. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 124 n.11 (1997) (noting that Imbler did not cite 
pre-1871 cases and relied primarily on “policy considerations”). 
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prosecutorial immunity purportedly rests on historical understandings, it is 
insupportable. 
III.  THE PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE CREATES CONFLICTS AND 
CONFUSION THAT COULD BE ELIMINATED BY THE UNIFORM APPLICATION 
OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
As members of the Supreme Court have recognized, the current doctrine 
of prosecutorial immunity is difficult to apply.168  Depending on the 
function they are performing at the time of the alleged misconduct, 
prosecutors are sometimes entitled to absolute immunity and sometimes 
entitled to qualified immunity.169  Absolute immunity protects prosecutors 
acting as advocates even when they engaged in intentional and malicious 
misconduct;170 qualified immunity protects prosecutors engaged in non-
advocacy functions unless they violated clearly established law of which a 
reasonable officer would have known.171  Under the current doctrine, 
drawing the line between conduct entitled to absolute immunity and 
conduct entitled to qualified immunity is a complicated question that has 
generated multiple conflicting decisions.172  The two most recent cases 
where the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on this issue are excellent 
examples of the problem:  Pottawattamie County v. McGhee173 and 
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd.174
A.  Pottawattamie County v. McGhee 
 
The Pottawattamie County case presented two interrelated issues:  (1) is 
fabrication of evidence by a prosecutor before probable cause is established 
a due process violation; and (2) if so, which type of immunity—absolute or 
qualified—attaches where the prosecutor subsequently uses that evidence at 
trial?  To understand these issues, some doctrinal background is helpful. 
The Supreme Court has held that the potent doctrine of absolute 
prosecutorial immunity is reserved for advocacy functions intimately 
connected with the judicial phase of the criminal proceedings.175
 
 168. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 286–91 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing in dissent that the distinction between advocatory and 
investigatory functions requires “difficult and subtle distinctions” and that “the rule the 
Court adopts” in the majority opinion “created more problems than it has solved”); Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 n.33 (1976) (“Drawing a proper line between these functions 
may present difficult questions . . . .”). 
  Since 
qualified immunity is presumed to be sufficient to protect honest officials 
from litigation and liability for honest mistakes in the conduct of their 
 169. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–70; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430–31. 
 170. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 124; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427. 
 171. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268. 
 172. Johns, supra note 10, at 89–106. 
 173. 130 S. Ct. 1047 (2010) (cert. granted; case settled and dismissed after oral 
argument). 
 174. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
 175. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. 
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office,176 prosecutors receive only qualified immunity for misconduct in 
performing investigative and administrative functions.177  Determining 
whether a prosecutor’s misconduct is an act of investigation or advocacy is 
one of the most vexing questions arising under the prosecutorial immunity 
doctrine.178
One clear distinction was established in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons.
 
179  In 
Buckley, the prosecutor had conspired with police to fabricate evidence 
during the preliminary investigation of a rape and murder case.  The Court 
concluded that before a prosecutor has probable cause to arrest a defendant, 
“[a] prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an 
advocate.”180  Thus, before probable cause is established, only qualified 
immunity applies.  But the Court declined to rule on whether the plaintiff’s 
due process rights had been violated by the prosecutor’s coercion of and 
payment for witness testimony because the claim was unclear and had not 
been addressed by the lower court.181  In Justice Scalia’s view, claims about 
the fabrication of evidence were unlikely to support civil rights actions 
since, as he stated, he was aware of “no authority for the proposition that 
the mere preparation of false evidence, as opposed to its use in a fashion 
that deprives someone of a fair trial or otherwise harms him, violates the 
Constitution.”182
Since Buckley, the lower courts have split on this issue.  The Third and 
Seventh Circuits have held that coercion violates only the witness’s rights, 
not the criminal defendant’s rights.
 
183  The Second Circuit has held that 
prosecutorial misconduct in gathering evidence violates the defendant’s 
rights.184  In Justice Thomas’s view, the failure to find a constitutional 
violation when prosecutors fabricate evidence “leaves victims of egregious 
prosecutorial misconduct without a remedy.”185  The lower courts have also 
split on the issue of which immunity applies if the prosecutor subsequently 
uses the tainted evidence in the criminal proceeding.  The Third Circuit has 
held that absolute immunity applies,186 but the Second and Ninth Circuits 
apply qualified immunity.187
 
 176. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 281 (Scalia, J., concurring); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 
486–87 (1991); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811 (1982). 
 
 177. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273 (majority opinion). 
 178. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33. 
 179. 509 U.S. 259 (1993). 
 180. Id. at 274. 
 181. Id. at 279. 
 182. Id. at 281 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 183. Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d 118, 121 (3d Cir. 2000); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 
20 F.3d 789, 794 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 184. Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 185. Michaels v. McGrath, 531 U.S. 1118, 1119 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
 186. Michaels v. McGrath, 222 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 187. Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001); Zahrey, 221 F.3d at 347. 
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These are precisely the questions presented by Pottawattamie County v. 
McGhee.188
The facts of the McGhee case are tragic.  In 1978, Curtis W. McGhee and 
Terry Harrington were convicted of murdering a retired police officer who 
was working as a security guard.
  If a prosecutor fabricates evidence or coerces testimony in the 
early stages of a criminal investigation, is that a violation of the criminal 
defendant’s due process rights?  And if so, is the prosecutor entitled to only 
qualified immunity because the misconduct occurred in the investigative 
stage?  Or if the prosecutor subsequently uses that evidence in the criminal 
proceeding, is the prosecutor entitled to absolute immunity because 
introducing evidence is advocacy that is intimately connected with the 
judicial phase of the criminal trial? 
189  The prosecutor obtained these 
convictions by offering perjured testimony, fabricating evidence, and failing 
to disclose compelling exculpatory evidence.190  McGhee and Harrington 
were found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment.191  Their post-
conviction actions for relief were denied.192  In 2002, their convictions were 
finally overturned for prosecutorial misconduct by the Iowa Supreme 
Court—after they had served twenty-four years of their life sentences.193
McGhee and Harrington then brought civil rights actions against the 
county, as well as the prosecutors and investigators involved in the case.
 
194  
They contended that the defendants violated their constitutional rights by 
withholding exculpatory evidence and using perjured testimony and 
fabricated evidence.195  Defendants moved for summary judgment, 
claiming qualified and absolute immunity.196  The prosecutors argued that 
there was no constitutional violation in procuring or fabricating evidence 
before the filing of the “True Information.”197  In their view, it was only 
using the evidence at trial that was unconstitutional and that they were 
entitled to absolute immunity for this misconduct because it was 
prosecutorial advocacy intimately connected to the judicial proceedings.198  
The district court granted in part and denied in part these motions.199
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the 
trial court’s ruling.
 
200
 
 188. 130 S. Ct. 1047 (2010) (cert. granted; case settled and dismissed after oral 
argument). 
  The court pointed out that it had previously held that 
that “a person’s due process rights are violated when police officers use 
 189. McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, 547 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 190. Id. at 926–28. 
 191. Id. at 927. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 925. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 930–31. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 931. 
 200. Id. at 926. 
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falsified evidence to procure a conviction.”201  The court affirmed that 
procuring or fabricating false evidence is a constitutional violation 
regardless of whether it was done by police officers or by prosecutors.  As 
the court observed, “‘[I]t would be a perverse doctrine of tort and 
constitutional law that would hold liable the fabricator of evidence who 
hands it to an unsuspecting prosecutor but exonerate the wrongdoer who 
enlists himself in a scheme to deprive a person of liberty.’”202  And the 
court held that where the prosecutor’s misconduct consisted of both 
fabricating the evidence and then using the evidence at trial, immunity does 
not shield the misconduct.  Fabricating the evidence before the filing of 
formal charges was not “a distinctly prosecutorial function” entitled to 
either absolute or qualified immunity.203
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict 
in the lower courts on these questions.  Specifically, in Pottawattamie 
County, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that its decision was consistent 
with the view of the Second Circuit,
 
204 but in tension with that of the 
Seventh Circuit.205  This case was dismissed after full briefing and oral 
argument,206
B.  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd 
 so this conflict remains unresolved. 
Most recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided Ashcroft 
v. al-Kidd.207  The question presented was whether the U.S. Attorney 
General was entitled to absolute or qualified immunity when he used a 
material witness warrant with the intent to detain a person suspected of 
terrorist activity for investigation.208
Since the case was an interlocutory appeal following the denial of a 
motion to dismiss, the facts are taken from the plaintiff’s complaint.
  While the al-Kidd case arose in the 
context of a material witness warrant, it raised the broader question of the 
relevance of the prosecutor’s subjective state of mind in applying the 
prosecutorial immunity doctrine. 
209
 
 201. Id. at 932.  The Supreme Court has previously recognized that where prosecutors 
and police engage in the same act of misconduct, the law would protect the prosecutor, but 
not the police officer.  As the Court stated in Buckley, “[I]t is ‘neither appropriate nor 
justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other.’” 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (quoting Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 
602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973)). 
  
Plaintiff Abdullah al-Kidd was born in Kansas in 1972; his parents, 
 202. McGhee, 547 F.3d at 932 (quoting McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, 475 F. Supp. 
2d 862, 907 (S.D. Iowa 2007)). 
 203. Id. at 933. 
 204. Id. at 932–33; see Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 344, 349 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 205. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 206. Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (2010); see Boundaries of 
Prosecutorial Immunity, supra note 3 (reporting that the case was settled for $12 million for 
two wrongfully convicted men). 
 207. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
 208. Id. at 2079. 
 209. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 952 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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siblings, and two children are also native-born U.S. citizens.210  While 
attending college at the University of Idaho in the mid-1990s, the plaintiff 
converted to Islam and changed his name from Lavoni T. Kidd to Abdullah 
al-Kidd.211  Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the federal 
government began conducting surveillance of the plaintiff.212  The 
surveillance logs found no illegal activity by the plaintiff and he has never 
been charged with a crime.213  In March 2003, the plaintiff planned to travel 
to Saudi Arabia on a scholarship with an established university to further 
his language and religious studies.214  When he was at Dulles Airport in 
Virginia, the FBI arrested al-Kidd pursuant to a material witness warrant 
issued in Idaho in the case of Sami Al-Hassayen, who had been indicted for 
visa fraud and making false statements to the government.215  Al-Hassayen 
was never convicted of those or other charges.216
The affidavit submitted by FBI agents to obtain the plaintiff’s warrant 
incorrectly stated that the plaintiff was taking a one-way, first-class flight to 
Saudi Arabia for $5,000, when in fact he had a round-trip ticket costing 
about $1,700.
 
217  Moreover, the FBI affidavits failed to disclose that the 
plaintiff:  had voluntarily talked to the FBI on previous occasions; had 
native-born U.S. children; had not been contacted by the FBI for six months 
before his arrest; had never been told by the FBI that he might be needed as 
a witness, that he should not travel, or that he should inform the FBI if he 
intended to travel; and had never been asked to surrender his passport or 
postpone his trip.218
After his arrest, al-Kidd was interrogated without counsel.
 
219  Following 
the magistrate judge’s suggestion (without advice of counsel), the plaintiff 
agreed to have his hearing in Idaho.220  He spent the next fifteen nights in 
jails in Virginia, Oklahoma, and Idaho, in high-security wings with 
convicted criminals.221  He was repeatedly strip-searched and routinely 
shackled.222  When he was finally released from detention, he was required 
to live with his in-laws, report regularly to the government, and remain in a 
limited geographic area.223  The government never called al-Kidd as a 
witness in the criminal trial against Al-Hassayen,224
 
 210. Id. at 951–52; Brief for Respondent at 1, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) 
(No. 10-98), 2011 WL 219561, at *1. 
 which did not 
 211. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 952; Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 1. 
 212. Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 1. 
 213. Id. 
 214. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 952; Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 2. 
 215. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 953; Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 2. 
 216. Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 2. 
 217. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 952–53; Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 2. 
 218. Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 3. 
 219. Id. at 4 
 220. Id. at 4–5. 
 221. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 953; Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 5. 
 222. Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 5. 
 223. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 953; Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 5. 
 224. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 954; Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 5. 
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commence for more than a year after his arrest.225  Even after the Al-
Hassayen trial, the government maintained close supervision of the plaintiff 
until he moved for relief.226  Based on public statements by high ranking 
federal officials—including FBI Director Robert Mueller and the head of 
the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division, Michael Chertoff—al-Kidd 
alleged that he was improperly arrested and detained without probable 
cause for the purpose of investigating his possible criminal activities, not 
for the purpose of securing testimony in the criminal trial of Al-
Hassayen.227
Ashcroft moved to dismiss al-Kidd’s complaint on the grounds of 
absolute and qualified immunity.
 
228  In his view, the decision to submit a 
material witness warrant is always a prosecutorial function.229  The district 
court rejected the motion, finding that the use of the material witness 
warrant to “detain individuals while investigating possible criminal activity 
qualifies as a police type investigative activity, not prosecutorial 
advocacy.”230
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling.
 
231  While 
recognizing that absolute immunity may often attach to the government’s 
decision to seek a material witness warrant,232 it distinguished cases where 
the decision to seek a material witness warrant was to further an 
investigative—not prosecutorial—function.  In such cases, only qualified 
immunity applies.233  In reaching this conclusion, the court candidly 
considered the goal and intent of the prosecution in seeking the warrant.234  
The court stressed that its conclusion did not rest on naked allegations of 
motive but on plausible facts from the public record and other objective 
indicia.235  Former Attorney General Ashcroft petitioned for certiorari as to 
whether the court of appeals erred by denying him absolute immunity on 
the grounds that he was using the material witness warrant as a pretext to 
investigate and preventively detain terrorism suspects.236
On May 31, 2011, the Court issued its decision in al-Kidd.
 
237  The Court 
held that Ashcroft was entitled to qualified immunity because the material 
witness warrant was valid under the Fourth Amendment’s objective 
reasonableness standard.238
 
 225. Brief for Respondent, supra note 
  Since Ashcroft did not violate clearly 
210, at 5. 
 226. Id. 
 227. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 954–55; Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 5–10. 
 228. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 957. 
 229. Id. at 959. 
 230. Id. at 956. 
 231. Id. at 981. 
 232. Id. at 959–60. 
 233. Id. at 960. 
 234. Id. at 960–62. 
 235. Id. at 962–63. 
 236. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at I, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) (No. 
10-98), 2010 WL 2830439, at *I. 
 237. 131 S. Ct. 2074. 
 238. Id. at 2080. 
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established law, he was immune from liability under § 1983.239  Justice 
Scalia concluded, “[W]e need not address the more difficult question of 
whether he enjoys absolute immunity.”240
While the Court was able to dodge the absolute immunity question in 
al-Kidd, that difficult question remains unresolved.  Prior decisions have 
held that distinguishing between an investigative and an advocacy function 
often turns on the prosecutor’s purpose—that is, the prosecutor’s subjective 
state of mind.
 
241  For this reason, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held that 
when a prosecutor interviews a witness after probable cause has been met, 
the question of whether the prosecutor is acting as an investigator or an 
advocate depends on the prosecutor’s purpose in conducting the 
interview.242  Under this approach, the court must examine the events 
surrounding the conduct to determine the prosecutor’s intent.243
The need for extensive discovery to determine the prosecutor’s state of 
mind is illustrated by a Ninth Circuit case, KRL v. Moore.
 
244  In KRL, the 
plaintiff contended that after probable cause had been established, the 
prosecutor secured a search warrant which went beyond the need for 
preparation for the pending criminal case and sought to gather evidence of 
additional criminal activity.245  The court held that a genuine question of 
fact was presented as to whether the prosecutor obtained the warrant to 
collect evidence to prosecute the existing charges or for a collateral 
investigation.246  To determine the prosecutor’s motive, it was necessary to 
reconstruct events through notes and testimony, which required significant 
factual discovery.247
But injecting a substantive state-of-mind analysis into the immunity 
defense raises several problems.  First, the Buckley Court warned against 
allowing prosecutors to escape liability by simply claiming that 
investigative functions were for advocacy purposes.
 
248
 
 239. Id. at 2085. 
  Second, in its 
qualified immunity decisions, the Supreme Court has ruled that subjective 
inquiries lead to wide-ranging discovery which can disrupt effective 
government and prolong litigation, thus defeating the very purpose of the 
immunity defenses, which is to eliminate not just liability, but also 
 240. Id. 
 241. Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 638 (9th Cir. 2005); KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 
1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004); Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 633–35 (5th Cir. 2003); Broam 
v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 242. Genzler, 410 F.3d at 638; KRL, 384 F.3d at 1111; Cousin, 325 F.3d at 633–35; 
Broam, 320 F.3d at 1030–31. 
 243. Cousin, 325 F.3d at 629–35; Broam, 320 F.3d at 1033–34. 
 244. 384 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 245. Id. at 1112. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 276 (1993). 
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litigation.249  For this reason, the Court emphatically replaced the subjective 
standard with an objective standard in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.250
It is unlikely that the Court will resurrect a subjective standard in 
absolute immunity cases.  Allowing wide-ranging discovery into the 
prosecutor’s subjective state of mind seems as undesirable in absolute 
immunity cases as it was in qualified immunity cases before the Court 
adopted the objective standard in Harlow.
 
251
The simplest solution is to apply qualified immunity in all cases:  
regardless of whether the prosecutor was acting as an investigator or 
advocate, did the prosecutor violate clearly established law of which a 
reasonable prosecutor would have known?  If not, qualified immunity 
protects the prosecutor from liability.  If so, the prosecutor should be held 
liable for violating the accused’s well-established constitutional rights.  The 
current qualified immunity doctrine has evolved into a standard that “is 
sufficient to ‘protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion 
and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of 
official authority.’”
  But this is exactly what seems 
to be required to determine whether a prosecutor was acting in an 
investigative or advocacy capacity after probable cause is established. 
252  Indeed, qualified immunity protects “‘all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’”253
As the Pottawattamie County and al-Kidd cases illustrate, numerous 
conflicts in the application of the current prosecutorial immunity doctrine 
are generated by the difficulty of determining whether absolute or qualified 
immunity applies in a given case.  But in both of these cases, the Court 
never reached decisions on the absolute immunity questions, so the 
uncertainties remain.  Scrapping the doctrine of absolute immunity in favor 
of the uniform application of qualified immunity would eliminate much of 
the complexity and confusion.  As I have previously argued, absolute 
immunity undermines the integrity of the criminal justice process,
 
254 denies 
victims a remedy for constitutional wrongs,255 and fails to deter 
prosecutorial misconduct.256  Absolute immunity is unnecessary to protect 
honest prosecutors, who are protected by stiff requirements for pleading and 
proving a constitutional violation and by the doctrine of qualified 
immunity.257
 
 249. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–18 (1982). 
  Rather, the uniform application of the doctrine of qualified 
 250. Id. at 815–19.  Under the Harlow test, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity 
unless the alleged misconduct violated clearly established law of which a reasonable officer 
would have known. Id. at 818–19. 
 251. Id. at 815–19. 
 252. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978)); see 
Johns, supra note 10, at 136–39 (explaining that qualified immunity has evolved to a more 
efficient and protective standard since absolute prosecutorial immunity was adopted in 
1976). 
 253. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 
341 (1986)). 
 254. Johns, supra note 10, at 123–25. 
 255. Id. at 125–26. 
 256. Id. at 127–28. 
 257. Id. at 131–39. 
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immunity would simplify an unnecessarily complex area of the law, serve 
the criminal justice process, and protect the honest prosecutor while 
providing a remedy for intentional and malicious prosecutorial misconduct. 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity in federal civil rights 
actions is unsupportable.  From the point of view of public policy, absolute 
prosecutorial immunity leads to wrongful prosecutions and convictions, 
ruins the lives of the wrongly accused, subjects crime victims to the painful 
and protracted relitigation of their experiences, impairs public safety, 
wastes public resources, and undermines public respect for, and confidence 
in, the criminal justice system.  Moreover, absolute prosecutorial immunity 
is historically unjustified.  Section 1983 was adopted to provide a federal 
civil rights remedy against Southern prosecutors who were using criminal 
prosecutions to deny newly freed slaves their civil rights, and to punish and 
deter Union officers and officials from enforcing those civil rights.  It was 
not intended to shield prosecutors from liability; on the contrary, it was 
intended to subject them to liability.  And finally, the doctrine generates 
conflicts and confusion that complicate and prolong civil rights actions for 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
In place of absolute immunity, qualified immunity should be uniformly 
applied.  Qualified immunity would protect honest prosecutors from 
unwarranted litigation while affording victims of deliberate prosecutorial 
misconduct a remedy for the willful violation of their civil rights.  Qualified 
immunity would be consistent with the common law as it existed in 1871 
and with the purposes underlying the adoption of § 1983—providing a 
federal civil rights remedy for malicious prosecutions.  And the uniform 
application of qualified immunity would simplify and streamline the law by 
providing an objective standard that could be applied at the early stages of 
litigation to protect prosecutors not only from liability, but also from the 
burden of litigation. 
 
